

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

RECORDED TRANSCRIPTION

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INTERVIEW OF

*Lieutenant General Walter Piatt
U.S. Army*

March 4, 2021

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1 P R O C E E D I N G

2 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : Today is March 4, 2021 and the time is 2:08
3 p.m. I'm (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with the DoD Office of Inspector General.
4 With me is my colleague on the telephone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and
5 today's witness Lieutenant General Walter Piatt, and also with
6 General Piatt is Lieutenant Colonel who's serving as
7 General Piatt's legal counsel. We're conducting this interview in
8 separate telework locations in the State of Virginia, and General
9 Piatt and Colonel are in General Piatt's office in the
10 Pentagon. We're conducting this review [COR] as part of our
11 review of DoD roles, responsibilities, and actions to prepare for
12 and respond to the planned protests and its aftermath at the U.S.
13 Capitol on January 6, 2021. General Piatt, would you please
14 acknowledge that this interview is being recorded?

15 LTG PIATT: I acknowledge.

16 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : Also, please acknowledge that I gave you a
17 copy of the DoD IG Privacy Act Notice?

18 LTG PIATT: I also acknowledge.

19 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : Would you please raise your right hand for
20 the oath?

21 LTG PIATT: I am.

22 Whereupon:

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER E. PIATT

24 was called as a witness, placed under oath, and provided
25 the following testimony:

1 E X A M I N A T I O N

2 BY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

3 Q: I have given you a copy of an announcement of our
4 review and it kind of gives you a lot of information about the
5 scope of what we're doing but what I think I'm going to do is
6 skip directly to the events on the 6th. So if you put your mind
7 as imagine yourself back on the morning of the 6th. Okay, you've
8 got the elements of the D.C. National Guard there in the District
9 supporting the MPD. What did you do on the morning of the 6th? Or
10 what were you doing?

11 A: The morning of the 6th we were in the Pentagon. We, the
12 exact time I'm not sure. We made sure we had the set of the D.C.
13 National Guard reported in, and we requested from them and from
14 everybody on that date was there anybody -- were there any
15 additional requests that came in overnight for support? The
16 answer from the D.C. National Guard and the rest of the staff,
17 and the senior, Army senior leaders was, no. Nobody had received
18 any additional. So we did a really what we would call a
19 conditions check loosely just check to make sure everything was
20 right and that they had everything they needed, and that they
21 were in place. And those were coming in through our operations
22 channels that everything was -- the requested support was in
23 place.

24 Q: And sir, I beg your pardon. I got a little bit ahead of
25 myself, but first thing I need you to do is to ask you to confirm

1 what your job is and briefly describe what you're duties are.

2 A: Yes. I'm the Director of the Army staff. My duties and
3 responsibilities are to integrate and synchronize the entire
4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Secretariat staff, and
5 the Army staff to meet the directives and intentions of the
6 Secretary of the Army.

7 Q: And who is your supervisor?

8 A: My supervisor -- the senior leaders but I work directly
9 for the Secretary of the Army but indirectly supervised by the
10 Under Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and
11 the Vice Chief of the Staff Army.

12 Q: And how long have you been the Director of the Army
13 staff?

14 A: Since May of 2019.

15 Q: Okay. Thank you. And you, just a minute ago you
16 described what you were doing on the morning of the 6th. Was it
17 the Army Operations Center that was receiving these reports or
18 was there some other setup for communications, or command,
19 control, and communications?

20 A: Actually both. So, the Operations Center was getting
21 reports from other -- from all entities but also we would come up
22 on Secret VTC bridges that we've had established since COVID. So,
23 it's become a common operational procedure to operate disperse
24 throughout the staff. Even if we're all in the building we would
25 all come up on a current channel or bridge as we call it for

1 updates, and there are several of them but that's how we were
2 operating that day like we had previously been operating.

3 Q: Okay. Were there communication links established
4 between Army staff and the D.C. National Guard Headquarters, or
5 the Soldiers on the ground, or how was that set up? If it --

6 A: The --

7 Q: Go ahead.

8 A: Yeah, our Director of Operations put several LNO
9 packages, one downtown into the whatever the Headquarters was
10 called, I can't recall now, and also one at the Armory. We had
11 LNO packages there to facilitate coms and make it easier for
12 units to facilitate reporting.

13 Q: Who's the Director of Operations?

14 A: This would be, at that time Brigadier General Chris
15 LaNeve.

16 Q: And what kind of communication devices were being used
17 by these folks?

18 A: Mostly secure coms, they do a secure VTC, also
19 unclassified nets but also classified reporting nets, a net we
20 have he has one I believe. One what we would call a flyaway
21 package that can facilitate secure coms, and he puts a small
22 group of folks down there to make sure that they can have
23 communications back here. But the primary means of communication
24 for the day was secure VTC to everybody's headquarters or your
25 position within your headquarters like your desk. Like mine is in

1 my office.

2 Q: Yes. And so which headquarters are we talking about
3 just to be clear?

4 A: Oh, the National Guard Armory, General Walker's
5 Headquarters. We also had the various offices of the Secretary,
6 the G3, the Operations Directorate, General LaNeve as I
7 mentioned, my office and any other the staff all have either they
8 have one in their office or they moved to a conference room that
9 has a secure VTC.

10 Q: Was anyone monitoring the events at the Ellipse during
11 this time or at other protests sites or was it all about the D.C.
12 National Guard? Please help us understand that.

13 A: We were. So, what we had previously, I think there were
14 10. It's in the package that you have the planned activities I
15 believe were 10 planned activities. So there were planned
16 activities around the city. So we had those marked. The
17 Operations Team had an operations graphic of planned activities
18 of where they would be in the city. That was kind of our common
19 operational picture and people would report whether there was or
20 was not an activity going on there. That report could come in
21 from one of the other entities of Park Police or Secret Service,
22 or the D.C. National Guard, or any entity that reported it. It
23 could have been local news reporting that would cause us then to
24 maybe trigger an alert that something was happening at a
25 location.

1 Q: By the planned activities and you referred to us after
2 are you talking about the PowerPoint briefing dated December
3 31st?

4 A: Yes, I am. On slide three and four planned activities
5 one of two and two of two, that's really what we had moving into
6 this is estimated activities. Preregistered activities which is a
7 common practice for us to monitor what was what would be
8 scheduled or planned for any day or weekend.

9 Q: Understand. Sir, I'm going to now ask you kind of a
10 very broad and open-ended question and then based on your
11 response I'll have several things I probably want to drill into,
12 but broad question is would you please walk us through what
13 happened starting with the D.C. National Guard's mission in the
14 morning and all the way to D.C. National Guard personnel arriving
15 at the Capitol in the early evening. As you do that would you
16 please be as detailed as possible and highlight times, and
17 meetings, phone calls, decisions, or other matters that would be
18 relevant to our review please?

19 A: Yes. Well, in the morning we were just trying to verify
20 that they are actually in the position that they were asked to be
21 in, the traffic control points and the crowd control points at
22 the Metro stations, those reports came in. There was some
23 confusion. Were they there? Did they have the right uniforms on?
24 There was confusion about their outer black vest that the
25 National Guard wears when there on mission. It's common, part of

1 their uniform. I remember that it was -- there was an misleading
2 report that said they had body armor on which of course at the
3 time they were not authorized to wear but had it with them. And
4 then we clarified that even up here in the staff. I don't recall
5 who clarified it but it's, "No. That's the normal uniform for the
6 D.C. National Guard when they are on a mission like that. It
7 identifies themselves of who they are." And we thought that was
8 normal uniform, and we were already pretty sensitized to that
9 uniform. That was really the only wrinkle in the morning set.
10 They were in their places. The traffic control points, they have
11 the vehicles that they needed, and they were in the crowd control
12 points, and there was no reports of activity at their traffic
13 control points, or really excessive crowds that the crowd control
14 points were at the Metro station. Then, it's not real clear on
15 the time but at some point when the President's speaking that was
16 an event that obviously was planned. There were considerations.
17 Would there be counter protests? Would there be any incidents
18 that could ride around that? That all look to look to appear to
19 be safe and in running in good order from at least my
20 perspective, but I didn't have a lot of information. But then
21 afterwards the reports started to come in and probably sometime
22 between 1300/1330 of movement and mass demonstration moving
23 towards the Capitol, and moving to the Capitol, and possibly
24 breaking down barriers. The first reports we got were some of the
25 people were picking up bicycle racks and just moving them to the

1 side walking past the initial temporary barriers. That was a
2 report that came in. We didn't really see anything at this point,
3 I did not. Then we got reports that -- we were getting reports of
4 other things coming in over VTC and on unclass telephone. We got
5 a report that came in of suspicious packages being found around
6 the city, possibly a pipe bomb. Again this was initial report but
7 we were -- but the team had -- the Guard and forces had what they
8 needed to secure the area and then would later at some point I
9 assume would interrogate, but they had the thing secure. At that
10 time, that was about 14 -- after about 1400 probably 1410/1415
11 around that time that I received reports of a couple of
12 suspicious packages that could possibly be a pipe bomb, but
13 unknown, but were secure and were -- had that perimeter around
14 that secure. That's when I left my office and walked down to the
15 Secretary of the Army's office, Secretary McCarthy to give him an
16 update on I'm getting reports of these packages being seen, but
17 I'm also getting reports that they have them secured, isolated
18 and secured, and I wanted to render that report. As I got into
19 his office there were several phone calls ongoing with some of
20 his staff and then the phone call came in that, and I remember
21 this at 1420 as I walked into his office the Secretary received a
22 call on, I think there were like three different cell phones in
23 there but one of the cell phones from then, from Colonel [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED] a member of the D.C. National Guard and he was screaming
25 in the phone of reports of multiple explosions within the

1 District, and it was not -- it wasn't very audible but you could
2 hear explosions and he was yelling to the Secretary, and the
3 Secretary could tell he was under extreme stress and obviously
4 now the situation is unfolding he attempted to calm Colonel
5 ██████████ down and said, you know, render a report. Colonel
6 ██████████ said something to the effect of, "We've got explosions
7 going off in the District." It was at that time Secretary
8 McCarthy asked Colonel ██████████ to establish a conference call
9 with key members which I recall as being Capitol Police,
10 Metropolitan Police Department, and D.C. National Guard to let's
11 get a better understanding collectively of what the situation is
12 on the Capitol grounds. At 1425 Secretary McCarthy joined the
13 conference call to discuss and request, this call -- we think the
14 purpose of this call was obviously to request National Guard
15 forces, but in addition to Secretary McCarthy I think the
16 following people were on the line, and I'll say this up front
17 that it was not the clearest phone call. There's lots of
18 background noise. There were people coming in, some people coming
19 out, but the best we could tell is that we had, obviously
20 Secretary McCarthy was in his office, General Walker, the
21 Commander of the Guard, D.C. Guard; Chief Contee, MPD; Mayor
22 Muriel Bowser we believe was standing next to Chief Contee using
23 the same phone; Chief Sund, U.S. Capitol Police; Colonel ██████████,
24 the Executive Officer to Secretary McCarthy was in the room.
25 There was other staff in the room but as the phones were laid out

1 they kind of looked out towards the window and I couldn't tell. I
2 knew some of his personal staff was in the room. As the call
3 began others started to enter the room started to enter the room
4 but Michelle Pearce, the General Counsel for the Army, former
5 General Counsel for the Army came in the room. General McConville
6 came in from his adjoining doorway from his office, he could hear
7 the ruckus. Brigadier General Chris LaNeve, Director of
8 Operations; and then later on during the call General Flynn
9 joined some point after the call began. I'm not sure exactly when
10 but I know that he walked into the room. Various leaders and
11 staff entered and departed the Secretary's office and there were
12 multiple discussions ongoing and occurring simultaneously.

13 Q: Sir, could I ask you --

14 A: Army staff is in the room.

15 Q: -- one question at this point?

16 A: Sure.

17 Q: On this conference call it's in in the Secretary the
18 Army's office. In the SecArmy's office was it all on one phone?

19 A: This conference call was. It was on his unclass
20 military phone that's on his desk. There were still --

21 Q: So landline?

22 A: -- others with -- a landline. Yes, sir.

23 Q: Okay. Got you.

24 A: We dialed into -- dialed into a number just like we did
25 here. Others on the net I believe sounded like they were on cell

1 phones because you could hear a lot of background noises. There
2 were other people in the room and there were other phone calls
3 taking place. I believe like his media relations, people were
4 calling trying to find additional information. People were on
5 like his computer on the Internet looking at websites to try to
6 get a situation report from open sources and they turned on the
7 news. I don't recall which station, but he has a very large TV in
8 his office and some of his staff were watching the news. And you
9 could see it was all covering the Capitol as going on at the time
10 of the call and it was immediately apparent the U.S. Capitol
11 Police, MPD, Mayor's office, the D.C. National Guard were all
12 operated under extremely high levels of stress, and it was also
13 evident that the leaders involved in the call, nobody really had
14 a clear understanding of the situation. It was unfolding fast and
15 it appeared to be desperate. Multiple leaders it sounded like a
16 state of almost panic but in a high state that it was, like this
17 was desperate. You could hear it in the tone of their voices and
18 that I think was very important to the Secretary because even
19 though we couldn't get like a complete report, you know like a
20 military report, it really in my mind wasn't needed because
21 Secretary McCarthy could tell from what he could see on the TV,
22 what he could hear in their voices that the situation was dire
23 and immediately after everybody kind of screamed and yelled their
24 initial report and request Secretary McCarthy at 14, think at the
25 time was now about 1430 he asked General Walker how quickly his

1 QRF could respond. And General Walker stated that QRF would be
2 ready to move in 20 minutes. And Secretary McCarthy directed
3 General Walker to prepare to move to the Capitol building and
4 support the Capitol police, but to remain at the Armory until he
5 confirmed approval. And then Secretary McCarthy he realized
6 situation was desperate. He then ran out of the room to go gain
7 approval from the acting Secretary of Defense for use of the D.C.
8 National Guard to support the U.S. the Capitol Police. I believe
9 I saw General McConville, Brigadier General LaNeve depart with
10 him and they literally ran to do this. And I remain behind and
11 the Secretary told me before he departed that he was going to
12 move to gain approval and instructed me to get a plan. And I
13 instinctively knew what he meant. I knew that he understood and
14 did not question the people on the phone that the situation was
15 desperate and dire, and they needed immediate assistance. He
16 never doubted that. He literally ran down the E Ring to the
17 Assistant Secretary's office to do it.

18 Q: What did you understand Mr. McCarthy to mean by get a
19 plan?

20 A: That he was going to gain approval and we needed to
21 have a plan to employ the D.C. National Guard because now this
22 was a new mission and we were asking to support the penetration
23 and perimeter breach of the Capitol and this was not the mission
24 that he approved on the traffic control points and the crowd
25 control that the D.C. National Guard was currently executing.

1 Q: Okay. Please continue, sir.

2 A: Okay. But after the Secretary departed I inform the
3 participants on the call that Secretary McCarthy was moving to
4 meet with the Secretary of Defense to gain approval to support
5 the U.S. Capitol Police. The conference call continued but at
6 times it was very difficult to follow as multiple participants
7 spoke over one another. There was yelling and screaming and
8 shouting, and people -- in Chief Sund again requested, I believe
9 it was Chief Sund, I assume it was, requested immediate
10 assistance and I tried to calm the situation down by stating that
11 we understood it was immediate. We're moving to gain approval. We
12 need now to formulate a plan so when we get that approval we can
13 employ the Guard to support the plan. And in the response they
14 kept asking me to immediately release the National Guard and I
15 cautioned that we were trained and prepared. We could get ready
16 for crowd control the mission we were doing, but I advised
17 against clearing building that involved U.S. citizens and then
18 suggested that the law enforcement or perhaps the FBI had a
19 better suited reaction force that could begin to clear the
20 Capitol. In my head at this time I could see -- you could see it
21 on TV the perimeter that was being asked to provide support to
22 secure was already penetrated and in my mind the mission was
23 changing rapidly, or the mission -- the situation was unfolding
24 rapidly and the mission was changing to one where we would have
25 to clear the Capitol, and I say we collectively, the requirement

1 would be to clear the Capitol and to cordon the Capitol because
2 the security had been breached and I was trying to talk through
3 options to get a plan to best to that. And I did. I express
4 concerns about the National Guard was probably not the best force
5 to do an internal clearance of the Capitol from inside out, that
6 that was probably better suited but perhaps we should be suited
7 to be able to do the outer cordon that would free up whatever
8 federal officers were available to formulate that clearance
9 operation. I, then immediately Chief Contee, I interpreted I
10 think he took my advice or my recommendations on the plan as push
11 back or some type of denial because he immediately said, "For the
12 record you are denying our request for support, question?" So he
13 said that he put that in the question, and I immediately
14 responded that "we were not denying your request for support,
15 that the Secretary the Army was requesting authorization from the
16 Acting Secretary of Defense, and that the Secretary the Army had
17 directed General Walker to prepare his QRF to move" and I
18 continued to communicate that we needed to quickly develop a
19 basic plan before rushing into an unclear dynamic situation that
20 included a large number of protesters outside of the Capitol as
21 you can see on TV, and then what I assumed was another group of
22 violent protesters inside. And over the course of this call I had
23 to state this three times that I was not denying the request
24 because every time I would offer let's formulate a plan the same
25 answer or question would come back to me you're denying our

1 request?" I said it three times that I'm not denying your
2 request. That we are preparing to move pending approval from the
3 Acting Secretary Defense. And at the last, the third time they
4 asked me this after they asked it they said, "You're denying our
5 request and we are going to go to the media." And I could just
6 tell, I knew the situation was desperate. I wasn't able to calm
7 them, but I stated again for third time, "We're not denying your
8 request. We need to have plan for support for when the request is
9 approved."

10 Q: Sir, you said there was like three times --

11 A: And that --

12 Q: I'm sorry to interrupt, but I want to ask you the three
13 times was a Chief Contee that said so each time so you're denying
14 a request?

15 A: I believe the third time may have been Chief Contee.
16 I'm not 100 percent certain but they were both like in tandem
17 Chief Sund and Chief Contee were the ones I believe who were
18 speaking the most. But again, I can tell you it was loud,
19 chaotic, there was plenty of background noise. At first I thought
20 they may not be able to hear me clearly so I was trying to stay
21 as calm as I could and repeat those words that we are moving to
22 get this approved. We needed to get approval, or we needed a plan
23 so once we got approval we would be able to execute quickly. And
24 about 1445 one of the participants on the call I recall reported
25 that shots were fired in the Capitol building. And that I recall

1 that we, everybody was reacting differently. Like the call was
2 almost breaking up because of this report but we then got that
3 message down the hall to where the Secretary was in the Secretary
4 of Defense's office, so the Joint staff would know when they
5 would know. We believe that they heard the report before we had
6 got there but that was at 1445. And at the same time that phone
7 -- that call broke up I then came back to my office and joined
8 then what the G3 had left the phone call sometimes. I'm not sure
9 when he left, but General Charlie Flynn left the room because he
10 said, "I'm going to set up the plans bridge." Which means the
11 secured bridge that we can communicate on, the video
12 teleconference.

13 Q: That was not set up in that location at that time, the
14 bridge?

15 A: It was not. It could have been, but we have a plans
16 bridge that the G3 operates and owns. The Secretary has his own
17 bridge. We did not have it on because we were showing the news
18 which was the most important information coming in at that time
19 because everything else is coming to phone. He elected to put his
20 -- the local news up on his TV, his monetary and his TV are the
21 same. The rest of us like I have a -- I have a bridge number. The
22 G3 Operations, Plans, they have several bridge numbers so we say,
23 go to the plans bridge everyone knows what number to go to and we
24 joined on that plans -- he left the room to stand up that plans
25 bridge.

1 Q: Okay, sir. Two quick questions before I ask you to
2 continue. So, the phone call ended about 1445?

3 A: Yes.

4 Q: And the second question is after Mr. McCarthy left and
5 he went down that Acting Secretary Miller's office so that you
6 are not in communication with Secretary McCarthy or Secretary
7 Miller by VTC or any other means at this point. Is that correct?

8 A: That is correct. They're in a private session. I don't
9 know if they had anyone up on VTC. I assume they probably had
10 their OSD staff, but we were communicating via runner, but the
11 only thing we communicated was shots were fired. But we knew that
12 what we were -- what my assumption was that the Secretary was
13 down there and we will hear from him once he gets approval, but
14 that's what he was doing and I'm sure that the Secretary of
15 Defense --

16 Q: I just have one question, sorry. And on this before
17 General Flynn left the conversation what did he had to say on the
18 phone call?

19 A: I don't remember him saying anything on the phone call
20 other than talking to me telling me he was going to set up the
21 bridge and then he said, "I need to get the team moving." Words
22 to that effect, but he said it like behind my back and I was
23 looking at the phone.

24 Q: Okay. So now the phone call ends, please continue.

25 A: Yeah, so I come back to my office which is just down

1 the hall from the Secretary. I get up on my secure bridge and
2 General Flynn is already up there. Staff was coming on. The D.C.
3 National Guard Headquarters was coming on, and the first thing we
4 really were trying to say, "Okay. We have to get a plan put
5 together and we were getting -- it was a state of confusion I
6 would say at the Guard. I mean it was things were unfolding
7 rapidly. We needed to get a plan together, and we were all kind
8 of I think in a state of confusion in maybe shock, and so there
9 is a period there that everyone's coming up, "What do we need to
10 do?" "We need to come up with a plan." And I joined that and
11 there was already discussion going on by the time I got down
12 there but I said, "Everybody, let's relax. We're going to get
13 approval. We need to come up with a plan. I think that my
14 assumption will be that we will be asked to cordon the outer
15 perimeter of the Capitol to facilitate the clearance of the
16 Capitol and then allow for targeted arrests of those who were the
17 most violent folks." But, what we could see coming together was
18 the Capitol was overrun, penetrated, the perimeter was shattered,
19 now we're going to have to come up with a plan and our rough
20 estimate going into the staff planning was clearing it, cordoning
21 it, and allowing arrests from the whole government team there and
22 we assume that the mission of the D.C. Guard would be to provide
23 outer cordon which later turned out to be the plan, but we were
24 just in the staff planning process so we could prepare. And the
25 preparation began almost simultaneously at 1504 as we're talking

1 things through it felt like seconds to be honest with you but we
2 got word that the Secretary of Defense approve the request to
3 mobilize the D.C. National Guard and instructed the D.C. National
4 Guard to begin the plan for employment and that's in our -- what
5 we were --

6 Q: What time was that, sir? I'm sorry. What time is that?

7 A: 1504.

8 Q: 1504 you got word that the, can you state that again,
9 please?

10 A: We got word that the Acting Secretary of Defense gave a
11 verbal approval to the full activation of the D.C. National
12 Guard.

13 Q: Okay.

14 A: And so we're still planning. So now it's you've got a
15 recall, you've got to pull the people that are on the traffic
16 control point mission, the previously approved mission, and crowd
17 control. You've got to return them to the armory and now you've
18 got to -- and you've got to bring in people from the mobilization
19 and we have to remission, issue equipment, new orders, and get in
20 mission configuration to support what we still do believe the
21 most likely mission would be to go down and support the cordon of
22 the Capitol. And to us it was becoming very clear to the team on
23 the planning session that not only did the mission change from
24 traffic control points/crowd control that was approved, that was
25 requested by the mayor and approved earlier, but now the mission

1 that was requested for immediate support of help reinforce the
2 perimeter had also changed, that there wasn't a perimeter to
3 support, and that we had to -- you know there was no perimeter so
4 we needed a plan really what was in my mind is that we needed a
5 plan to take back the Capitol. And there was -- that was not met
6 with total agreement with the D.C. National Guard. There was some
7 professional banter back and forth about "we don't plan, we just
8 provide numbers. Tell us what you need." And we're like, "No, we
9 have to plan because we have to equip and we've got to configure
10 -- we've got to put units of people into unit configuration so
11 they can go down and meet this emerging mission that we were only
12 doing analysis and creating." We didn't really have a clear task
13 and purpose yet. And that was from 1504. This goes on for some
14 time, for almost an hour of building up his forces, recalling
15 forces, getting civil disturbance gear issued and putting buses
16 into order, getting vehicles lined up. This is all happening
17 simultaneously while our Secretary and a small planning team do a
18 couple of things, and I know this because we get reports back as
19 this occurs. He, the Secretary called Speaker Pelosi and he
20 called Senator Schumer. We believe that was about -- I believe it
21 was 1505.

22 Q: Were you on those calls?

23 A: And then it -- I was not. No, I was not on those calls.
24 We got report from his little -- his team, his staff that this is
25 what the Secretary had done. So, we get that report later on that

1 this is what the Secretary has done. He is called them and then
2 the next at 1510 he called Mayor Bowser. I'm not on the call but
3 we get report of that because it's important because he's telling
4 her that he's got the full approval to activate and mobilize D.C.
5 National Guard.

6 Q: Okay.

7 A: So he, yeah and then he configures, and he -- the
8 Secretary departs the building approximately 1548 and he has a
9 small team and it was actually -- it was rehearsed a little bit
10 during the June crisis but he has a small team that he departed
11 with to meet the Metropolitan Chief of Police and Mayor of the
12 MPD Headquarters. He gets there --

13 Q: Who went with him, sir?

14 A: -- about 1605.

15 Q: Sorry for the interruption, or the interruptions but
16 who --

17 A: No, no problem. He takes his immediate staff, but his
18 XO, Colonel [REDACTED] and Brigadier General Christopher LaNeve,
19 and I have to check because the following day I believe his legal
20 advisor Colonel [REDACTED] was with him, but I need to verify
21 that. Normally that's his package so I didn't take headcount but
22 that's normally who he travels with and he's got PSD and personal
23 security detachment and two vehicles. We got -- but he takes
24 Brigadier General LaNeve because General LaNeve is the Director
25 of Operations, Mobilization, Readiness for the Army, and General

1 LaNeve is sending back reports, "Okay." Because we're trying --
2 "Okay. We're here." You know, he sent us a report at 16 -- I
3 think he said it maybe 1610 but they arrived at 1605 and were
4 co-located with the Mayor, Mayor Bowser, and Chief Contee, and
5 they were reviewing the situation, and they were trying to
6 develop, started to develop courses of action and task and
7 purpose. This was critical to us because now we had someone on
8 the ground while the Secretary was in discussions of how best to
9 develop a plan to employ the Guard. General LaNeve with his other
10 duties in supporting Secretary was passing back reports to the G3
11 team so our collective staff that was on this planning bridge
12 would be kept updated of the current situation as we knew it
13 downtown.

14 Q: Sir, can I interject a question? And this has to --

15 A: Yes, sir.

16 Q: -- with we understand task, purpose, equipment,
17 transportation, coms, is this all synonymous with the so-called
18 CONOPS that we saw in a letter?

19 A: The -- yes. This is now we are developing a concept of
20 the operation. So, we're planning the planning session would
21 analyze all the facts, specified and implied tasks. It's a
22 doctrinal process we use called the Military Decision Making
23 process and it results and operations order or a concept of the
24 operation, and that can be formal, written pages, it could be
25 informal. It could be a drawing on a piece of paper, or could be

1 a verbal explanation of what operation I need to do so that we
2 know we have scoped the environment, we've analyze the threat,
3 we've equipped the forces correctly and they're prepared to
4 accomplish the mission and that higher understands what that
5 mission is.

6 Q: I ask because I noted in Mr. McCarthy's January 5th
7 letter to General Walker where he conveyed approval for the
8 request for assistance he indicated in there that he withheld the
9 authority to dispatch the QRF and he said he wouldn't do that
10 without a CONOPs, and I want to make sure that where -- this is
11 the type of activity we're talking about.

12 A: This is but this is now the type of activity related to
13 that complete new mission set that I described.

14 Q: The remission, yes.

15 A: Letter -- yeah, his letter here is why he puts it in
16 the letter in my mind. He says, "Because if we commit the QRF I
17 need the CONOP so I know that we're committing the QRF within the
18 scope that was approved for the mission." So in the previous
19 approved mission that he wrote this to them, that was the traffic
20 control points, the crowd control points, and that the QRF would
21 be needed -- for QRF in a military sense you would determine
22 what's my most likely commitment criteria, and what would I be
23 asked to do if I am the QRF? In this case the QRF was built and
24 designed, and postured to respond to the approved mission set to
25 support the Metropolitan Police Department with the traffic

1 control points and the crowd control. So this most likely
2 commitment would be what, and I don't know if they thought this,
3 but it could have been an additional traffic control point was
4 needed and we had no additional forces. You can ask to commit the
5 QRF, and that CONOP could have been as easily as explained on a
6 phone call to -- from -- I mean as a second lieutenant or even a
7 sergeant on up you would be able to explain this. They requested
8 an additional checkpoint. I have the ability to move. I have 40
9 people, or I only need 20 of them have vehicles and equipment,
10 request permission to move to this checkpoint, collocate,
11 establish traffic control point. The Secretary -- this is
12 hypothetical then would look at the map, cross-reference, say,
13 "Okay. That supports the request I'm hearing from the Mayor and
14 we can commit." So, the CONOP is not a written, you know,
15 doctorate thesis or anything. I mean they could be operation
16 orders and those are normally campaign plans, but it's just a
17 concept of the operations you're being -- you're asking now to
18 commit these forces to, and we had to create it this day because
19 the mission completely unfolded when the Capitol was -- the
20 Capitol perimeter was breached. The Capitol was penetrated and we
21 believed overrun. We didn't have good understanding of everything
22 going on inside but we believe the mission was changing now to
23 one of that was requested that the emergency request was, support
24 the perimeter was now in my mind as I was looking at it was now
25 new mission that we had to form to take back the Capitol. That's

1 what we were forming. Does that make sense, over?

2 Q: Thank you for clarifying, sir. So now it's some point
3 after 1600 Secretary McCarthy is at MPD Headquarters and he's
4 doing MDMP. So, please continue.

5 A: Yes, and he is doing it with Mayor Bowser, Chief
6 Contee, General LaNeve, and for us we don't come in with military
7 doctrinal language and terms that confuse one another. We
8 understand what they're trying to do and they're working together
9 discussing the task and purpose for the D.C. National Guard from
10 about 1610 to 1630 and they identified link up locations, and
11 confirmed key leaders at each link up site. That was pretty
12 critical and at that time right before that was ending Secretary
13 McCarthy about 1625 he asked General LaNeve to direct General
14 Walker to prepare the QRF at the Armory, to move to the Capitol
15 in anticipation of an authorization to support the Capitol
16 Police. General LaNeve relayed that back to us. I was not on the
17 call, but that's not uncommon that he's going to start movement
18 of an asset anticipating approval. I think Secretary McCarthy at
19 this time was assured he was going to get commitment or approval
20 to commit the D.C. Guard so as we heard that back here we're
21 like, "Okay. Everyone get ready. We've got to be ready to depart
22 the Armory, get your forces that are configured, get them into
23 vehicles ready to go. We could be getting approval at any minute.
24 And that approval came at, after 1632 phone call Secretary
25 McCarthy was on. I was not on it but he was on it, but he was on

1 it, again this gets reported back with the Acting Secretary of
2 Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Secretary McCarthy
3 provided his summary of the plan that he just built and we were
4 preparing for it back here to deploy, link up and employ the QRF
5 and all additional available forces. This really --

6 Q: How did you the word that --

7 A: And this was really what the --

8 Q: How did you get the word that Secretary Miller had
9 provided verbal authorization?

10 A: We got the word, and this was General LaNeve, and his
11 team, and Colonel [REDACTED] reporting back to us after these phone
12 calls would take place.

13 Q: Via cell phone I presume?

14 A: By cell phone and sometimes to the Armory, and then the
15 Armory on VTC. So things were coming in fast and furious on
16 multiple nets.

17 Q: Okay. Go ahead.

18 A: And we were -- and what the Secretary was doing with
19 everyone was trying to over communicate to stay transparent so we
20 wouldn't cause any unnecessary delays. You could just feel that
21 pace of pushing information out. At 1635 according to our
22 records, [REDACTED], he notified, Secretary McCarthy, I'm sorry.
23 Notified General Walker that the Acting Secretary of Defense
24 provided verbal approval of the full activation of the D.C.
25 National Guard in support of District of Columbia and Capitol

1 Police. Secretary McCarthy authorized General Walker to deploy
2 his QRF and all available forces in support of the US Capitol
3 Police. And General LaNeve then provided link up point and name
4 and contact information of the officer of the D.C. -- that at the
5 D.C. National Guard would report to. That summary --

6 Q: Sir, I've got to ask an important question.

7 A: That's summary came from --

8 Q: I think you're about to answer it. Please excuse me,
9 but I was going to ask how do you know that that occurred from
10 Secretary McCarthy at that time?

11 A: General LaNeve called us back after words to give us
12 the word of going and where the link up points would be. The
13 thing we didn't have up to this point was we kind of solved a
14 cordon, but we didn't have graphics. We didn't have a place to go
15 link up, so he didn't have a route to take them to. Who would
16 they report to and how would they immediately be employed in
17 concert with a greater plan and that's what the Secretary, the
18 Mayor, and Chief Contee were all coordinating and working
19 together so that when they received forces they could immediately
20 employ them with the greatest amount of efficiency and speed. I
21 mean that's just how we would assume this to go. So that's how
22 that we needed that link up point. We needed that link up person.
23 It's not uncommon in military operations when you're responding
24 to crisis that you go down the wrong road. You go to the wrong
25 place, you stop and nobody knows where you are. You lose comms.

1 We -- link up is absolutely critical and I think plan formed that
2 very nicely, and that was a result of the Guard and General
3 LaNeve, and the Secretary, and the Mayor, and all the folks down
4 there working it. We were only trying to make sure that they were
5 moving with most haste to be ready for when they got that
6 approval and they did. So that was given at that time. Now again
7 there's confusion, there's getting people into the vehicles. Do
8 you have the right vehicle? Do they know the route? Now they've
9 just been given the link up point. They probably have to plot
10 that link up point. I'm just filling this in just based on
11 military experience but we got word then it -- we didn't get word
12 again until 1700. About 1702 the D.C. National Guard reported
13 that they were initiating movement from the D.C. National Guard
14 Armory and the D.C. National Guard LNO, and the MPD operations
15 center confirmed that.

16 Q: Let me ask you this, sir. Did you -- are you aware of
17 General Walker's testimony to the Joint Senate committees
18 yesterday?

19 A: I am.

20 Q: Okay. Now he said, he testified I believe that he did
21 not get word about Secretary Miller's approval to basically send
22 everybody -- send the buses in support of the U.S. Capitol Police
23 until on or about 1708. Can you help us understand that, about
24 half-hour time difference?

25 A: Yeah, I don't know if I can. What I can say because I

1 know from the earlier phone call that it was a very heightened
2 level of confusion and chaos. My professional experience tells me
3 that is probably due to the fog and friction and the saying is
4 the fog and friction of war. This isn't war but it's certainly
5 complex crisis and I think that everybody in every session in
6 every phone call probably recorded a different time and maybe
7 recorded people saying different things. And I don't know if -- I
8 don't think that to be intentional is my professional view of
9 this. I believe it to be the confusion of a crisis.

10 Q: Thank you. Go ahead and continue.

11 A: And then, so that's the report we got there. Then we're
12 getting reports from downtown that were reporting that up to the
13 Chairman and the Acting SecDef because I was a little bit
14 concerned, "Okay. You're down there. Do you need me?" Like with
15 General LaNeve "Do you need me to report? Are you reporting?" But
16 they confirm that they were in communication, Secretary McCarthy
17 was in communication with the Acting SecDef and the Chairman of
18 the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So, we were trying to flatten those
19 coms and make sure the ops center here was reporting to the Joint
20 Command Center. Those are normal things. Not important, we just
21 want to make sure that reports were being rendered. We then
22 started to -- we then got reports of the building Capitol being
23 secure, but simultaneously we're keeping -- as Headquarters
24 Department of the Army we are keep -- we keep planning because we
25 still don't have all the Guard mobilize. We still have forces

1 coming in so he's got to continue to build his force strength,
2 issue equipment, continue to prepare for configuration so he can
3 move to the expanded mission of cordon or whatever additional
4 mission sets might be coming. We're just trying to keep the
5 momentum going within the D.C. National Guard and what support do
6 they need? Around this time it's not that they needed our direct
7 support were just helping facilitate coms, [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]. So, we had other things to consider, plan for, and
12 prepare contingencies. And so we were doing all those

13 contingencies and asking ourselves as a staff, what else -- as my
14 job as the Director of the Joint, or Joint Staff, sorry. The
15 Director of the Army staff, what else do we need to be doing so
16 that if the Secretary needs it, or our nation needs it that we'll
17 be prepared to respond? Now, it turned out that that was not
18 needed but there was coordination and there were people who came
19 to begin the facilitation of discussions if that was needed.

20 Q: [REDACTED]

21 [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED]

23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED].

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A: [REDACTED].

Q: [REDACTED]?

A: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Q: Okay. Thank you for that. What else about -- you left off that you had received reports that the Capitol building had been cleared.

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A: Right. So we received word that the Capitol building is clear so we knew our mission was to continue to build the cordon what we believe that would allow law enforcement then to be freed up from cordon activities to be able to make targeted arrests or to do more law enforcement. So we had an element clearing. You had a cordon being built with other police entities, and that D.C. National Guard, but the more Guard forces that we could get to the perimeter would free up police so they could do the target arrest which they're best suited for. So we were just trying to facilitate the movement, or mobilization and movement of the rest of the D.C. National Guard.

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Q: Sir, the Soldiers on the buses that left the Armory shortly after 1700, were they all Soldiers that had been repositioned from traffic control points, and Metro stations, and the QRF, or did it include any Soldiers who were reporting because of the mob order, or do you know?

23

24

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A: I don't know for sure. We assumed at the time the fastest one was the QRF and the Soldiers that were being remissioned from the previous mission. But he also had Soldiers

1 that were on COVID support mission. He had Soldiers out doing
2 other operations and missions that he felt could come in. But as
3 we were planning it we kept saying just put them in the best unit
4 configuration you have. Everybody was coaching, teaching, not --
5 but everyone was throwing out ideas in a very open, collaborative
6 session to get the best unit integrity that we could get with
7 leadership and with equipment, and the Soldiers were gelling. So
8 something told me that they were coming in and somewhat unit
9 familiar packages because it was -- the pace was picking up on
10 numbers. That's the kind of -- that's the atmospherics that we
11 were led to believe up here at Headquarters DA.

12 Q: Okay. General Piatt, the DoD timeline that document
13 number five I think you referred to that a few times.

14 A: Yes.

15 Q: It talks about at 1334 that Secretary McCarthy had a
16 phone con with Mayor Bowser. Were you on that call?

17 A: I was not. I did not join the phone call until 1420
18 when I got to the Secretary's office that day was the first phone
19 call I was on with him.

20 Q: And, the second question is referring back to General
21 walkers testimony yesterday before the Joint Senate committees,
22 he testified that he had a call with Chief Sund then around 1349
23 and after that call ended he immediately conveyed Chief Sund's
24 RFI to Army, what he called Army senior leaders. He later
25 identified the senior leaders as you and General Flynn. What time

1 was that call? Where he conveyed that to you and General Flynn?

2 A: Yeah. I believe that to be incorrect. I believe that
3 the first time, what we have is our records, the first time I was
4 on the call with the D.C. National Guard from the crisis was at
5 1420 when I was in the Secretary's office and that was Colonel
6 [REDACTED] rendering a report of explosions from what I
7 thought were suspicious packages that were isolated. That turned
8 out not to be true, but those were the first reports, and then at
9 1425 when we join the conference call that was when General
10 Walker was on the call. That was the first call I was on with
11 him. General Flynn and I were not on the call previously to that
12 with General Walker together.

13 Q: The reason I ask you that way, sir, in that particular
14 way, sir, is because I'm a little confused by General Walker's
15 testimony versus the timeline here, because he said yesterday
16 that when he called to relay Chief Sund's request he was told Mr.
17 McCarthy was not available but, I've also got other information
18 that Mr. McCarthy was on the line when you got there.

19 A: Yes. I don't know if he made an earlier phone call to
20 his office and he was confused. I'm not aware of Secretary
21 McCarthy being unavailable except for the time he ran out of the
22 office and departed the phone call, and that was deliberate. The
23 rest of the day he had multiple phones on him and he was always
24 in reach.

25 Q: Well, General Walker did mention a call yesterday,

1 yesterday as he testified he mentioned a call occurred at 1430
2 with Army senior leaders. Now, he didn't think Mr. McCarthy was
3 on that call. Maybe I think you said Mr. McCarthy left shortly
4 during the call, so that could be a source of confusion, but is
5 that --

6 A: Yeah, that --

7 Q: Is that the 1422 call on the DoD timeline? Is that the
8 same thing?

9 A: I think that's before he left. Yes. --

10 Q: Okay.

11 A: -- I had in my own notes that it was 1425, but there
12 was an initial, why I explained it was there was an initial call
13 from Colonel [REDACTED] that reported explosions. We're starting to
14 see things on TV, heightened sense of the situation is unfolded
15 rapidly. We join everybody on a conference call, and again, I'm
16 not certain of everybody that was on that conference call, and
17 I'm not certain when they joined. It was very chaotic and very
18 loud, and people's voices you could hear, in all my years of
19 being in the Army and being in combat we could hear by the tone
20 of their voice we knew that the situation was rapidly unfolding.
21 Nobody, nobody doubted that the situation was serious. So I
22 believe that the discrepancy on his may be related to maybe
23 perhaps he just join the call late and didn't hear Secretary
24 McCarthy say that. And Secretary McCarthy may have believed that
25 Colonel [REDACTED] being on the line was General Walker. I don't

1 know, but I will tell you from the chaos of that phone call all
2 those could be possible.

3 Q: General Piatt, we've seen some media reporting and
4 we've heard General Walker's remarks yesterday where he
5 attributed statements to you or to General Flynn regarding the
6 "optics" or "visual" of putting Soldiers on the ground at or near
7 the Capitol. What is your comment about that reporting and on
8 General Walker's statement?

9 A: I don't recall in this phone call ever using the word
10 "optic" and why I say that is because we saw the -- the TV was
11 already showing the images of the walls being scaled, people
12 penetrating the voices were saying the perimeter is being -- or
13 the building is being breached. To say word that the optic of
14 Soldiers on the Capitol is not what we would want, to me is not a
15 relevant assessment of the situation that was unfolding presently
16 and right at that phone call. I believe that because they were
17 several calls and there were numerous planning sessions done over
18 the weekend or discussions, or analysis leading up to the mission
19 that those phrases may have been said by other people. Was optics
20 a concern for us as we prepared to use Soldiers down town in
21 Washington D.C.? Absolutely. It's part of the assessment criteria
22 you would look at when given a mission even as traffic control
23 points. You want to make sure that that that visual does not
24 create a reaction that you're trying to calm down. So you want
25 the posture of the force to meet the mission that would that you

1 wanted to provide. So, at that time I can't say why people say
2 that I would say that. I don't ever recall saying it in that
3 phone call. What I recall saying was that "I do not believe it's
4 the best use of the National Guard to clear the building since we
5 had a hostile in a very dangerous force outside and perhaps a
6 very violent force inside, and in my mind my assessment was that
7 was more a law enforcement or SWAT mission, or FBI mission would
8 be better suited and the National Guard could prepare quicker to
9 prepare a cordon to allow the building to the cleared."

10 Q: Did General Flynn say something about optics or
11 visuals?

12 A: No, not to -- I don't recall anyone saying it in that
13 phone call. I do not and I've gone over all my notes. I just
14 don't recall saying that.

15 Q: Do you recall saying that on any other phone call with
16 General Walker?

17 A: Not with General Walker I don't believe, no.

18 Q: Did you or General Flynn say words to the effect of,
19 "Presence of the National Guard on the Capitol grounds could
20 further incite the crowd?"

21 A: No. I don't believe we did. I believe in this phone
22 call, and I don't know who was on it, somebody asked in the phone
23 call, "Could we get the FBI? Could we get the SWAT Team?" And
24 somebody said, I don't know who was, but they did say very
25 clearly, "The presence of that force could incite the crowd to

1 react to it and that could cause further hostilities or
2 additional problem sets that we would have to face." I took that
3 as a professional, somebody just throwing out ideas. When I heard
4 that I did not look to hear that as somebody was saying no to the
5 use of that. I don't think anybody on the phone call doubted the
6 urgency and the need for immediate assistance. It's just because
7 the situation was unfolding so rapidly we were not prepared to
8 respond in the time they were requesting us to respond in.

9 Q: Did you or General Flynn say on that -- or that call or
10 any other call that, "Your best military advice to the Secretary
11 the Army would be not to have a military at the Capitol?" Or
12 words to that effect.

13 A: I think I said words to that effect and recommended
14 that it would not "my best advice or my best recommendation to
15 use the National Guard to be the clearing force for the Capitol."

16 Q: And is that different from having them saying that,
17 "Your best military advice would be, to the Secretary the Army
18 would be not to have them at the Capitol at all?" Did you not say
19 that?

20 A: I don't -- did I -- I want to make sure I understand
21 the question. I'm sorry.

22 Q: Well, I think you answered my questions by stating that
23 you did say that your best advice would be not to have the
24 Soldiers engaging clearing operations. Do you also say that,
25 "Your best advice would be to not have the military at the

1 Capitol at all?"

2 A: No. And I don't know if I use the word "best military
3 advice", but that is something that would not be uncommon for me
4 to say I just don't recall it. I did say that, "My best advice
5 would be to use them as a cordon force to facilitate the
6 clearing."

7 Q: Did General Flynn say anything to either of those
8 effects either on the cordon or on having Soldiers around the
9 Capitol at all?

10 A: Not on that phone call, but when we got to the secure
11 planning bridge with just staff and D.C. Guard forces he talked
12 about ideas about we need to build the cordon. He was walking us
13 through options for operations. He's actually in many regards
14 leading that discussion by the time I joined.

15 Q: Did General Walker joined the secure planning bridge?

16 A: He did and he was being pulled in and out because he
17 was getting phone calls and there was a time when we actually
18 made a phone call to him. He wanted to come off the bridge and
19 call me. I could see his VTC goes into his office on his
20 conference table so you can see them running in and out of the
21 office and you could see General Walker being called to different
22 phone calls, but either his Deputy or his Ops colonel was there,
23 or Sergeant Major. There's always two or three people there and
24 he was monitoring and taking several different phone calls doing
25 what commanders do during crisis, he's handling -- he's talking

1 on many different nets sometimes simultaneously. During a
2 planning bridge to be honest, we're staff. And we would not
3 expect a commanding general to be part of the planning bridge. We
4 expect the staff to plan and provide options to commanders. And
5 that's what we were trying to do.

6 Q: Okay. How did the events in Washington D.C. during June
7 of 2020 influence the planning and decision making on January 6?

8 A: My assessment is that they influenced events heavily,
9 and I was witness to the events in June. There was, again another
10 sad day for our nation obviously but the D.C. National Guard, the
11 Soldiers, and there were days of violence leading up to it in
12 June. So there were indicators and there was time to plan, and
13 prepare, and move the Guard to various mission sets, and the
14 Soldiers I thought were incredible. I thought they were
15 professional, identified, prepared but what you could see is they
16 were being committed to another entity either Park Police, Chief
17 Police, Secret Service Police, or some other federal entity and
18 that entity believe they had full, in military terms, full
19 operational control and to me that was -- it was a bit concerned
20 because we didn't know what the boundaries of employment or use
21 of force were. We knew what the Guard was trained to do and what
22 they believe they were but we were seeing everybody was
23 interpreting use of force a bit differently. And what we saw in
24 that time during the planning session, or not planning sessions,
25 during the Secretary sessions and communications with General

1 Walker and his team is that the leadership, although the Guard
2 Soldiers employed with precision, and I think with great
3 professionalism. The leaders were challenged by the situation and
4 could not offer a coherent plan or recommendation to the
5 Secretary on how best they could be employed given the situation
6 as we were beginning to understand. There were threats against
7 monuments. There were threats against breaches perhaps even the
8 White House, and there was a plan then to put traffic control
9 points around the city using National Guard forces. In one
10 incident the Guard reported they had checkpoints at one location
11 when the Secretary, I wasn't there but this is the report he gave
12 us and questioned when they went to verify the location of
13 checkpoints nobody was there. The D.C. Guard had a hard time
14 having a good common operational picture of where their forces
15 were being employed to. That was a concern because we thought
16 Soldiers, Guardsmen could be committed, and then the use of that
17 aspect of that asset could then be directed by somebody that
18 would perhaps would not be aligned with the mission that was
19 approved and could actually violate the authorities given to that
20 for us to authorize that force to be used as well. My fear of
21 watching this as the Director of the Army staff during June is
22 that they would be used to commit Soldiers without a plan and
23 place them in areas of high risk and perhaps do more harm than
24 what was already being conducted. And we saw this in the night
25 that the helicopter was employed over the crowd near Lafayette

1 Square. And, as a military professional I couldn't understand how
2 that was authorized for use. I questioned that. We all did. I
3 wasn't in command but I wanted who made that call and then after
4 the fact the investigation is completed but not briefed yet. What
5 we were afraid of is that military assets would be employed
6 without military command, and that weighed in heavily when forces
7 were requested in support of January 6.

8 Q: General, these -- your comments over the last couple of
9 minutes regarding in response to my question about how June 2020
10 influenced the decisions and actions on January 6, did they also
11 influence the conditions we saw in Secretary Miller's January 4
12 letter to Secretary McCarthy, and then in the January 5th letter
13 from Secretary McCarthy to General Walker?

14 A: Yes. And they impacted our lead up, and planning, and
15 preparing for the missions on the 5th. So, this was really
16 weighing on our minds on the weekend I believe the dates were the
17 2nd the 3rd, and I think -- and they played out because Secretary
18 McCarthy's letter to Secretary of Defense on 4 January spells out
19 the requirements that he is asking for and then he even talks
20 about, "I would like to approve these if the following conditions
21 are met: A lead federal agency other than DoD. Enable to enhance
22 coordination of all entities and get all the estimated numbers
23 and all federal agencies have exhausted their assets in support
24 these events." And then Secretary Miller responds and approves
25 but does not authorize the following. And he runs down a series

1 of events that would not allow the mission to be expanded by
2 somebody who didn't have the authority to do so. And we thought
3 that letter was the right constraints to allow us to do the job
4 that was approved, do the mission that was approved without
5 having that mission expand into something that was not
6 authorized.

7 Q: What was your role in reviewing the request for
8 assistance that General Walker signed on January 1st where he
9 enclosed the request from D.C., and then which resulted in
10 Secretary McCarthy's letter on January 5th to General Walker? How
11 were you involved in making that sausage as it were?

12 A: Yes, well anytime we get a request for assistance the
13 staff is alerted so we can provide the needed staff work and
14 analysis to help the Secretary frame a decision for him or assist
15 him in making that decision. Secretary McCarthy had several
16 conversations on the 2nd and 3rd with the Secretary of Defense
17 and Secretary of Defense had several conversations and so we
18 would -- he would summarize during those days on the 2nd and the
19 3rd what he felt was being asked, and he was asking for staff
20 assistance in formulating his -- what he would need to make the
21 right recommendation to Secretary Miller. So, our role as we saw
22 it was clear that Secretary McCarthy thought that it was a valid
23 request I think, but he wanted -- he needed to be able to make
24 sure that we staffed it correctly. We requested. It was staffed
25 correctly, and he was formulating the right request to Secretary

1 of Defense for that approval. So, our job is just to do staffing,
2 make sure it got the right legal review. Make sure his General
3 Counsel reviewed it before he signed it and just give him fast
4 our best military advice to the Secretary.

5 Q: Are you normally involved in the RFI? Or, I'm sorry.
6 The RFA, request for assistance staffing and approval process?

7 A: I'm involved. I oversee every task that comes to the
8 Headquarters Department of the Army. I'm responsible to track
9 every request whether it comes from an external entity or it
10 comes from OSD. If it comes from outside channels or improper
11 channels, I'm responsible to make sure that we get it in the
12 proper staff channels, and every request varies on who needs to
13 see it. In this case it's the General Counsel for the United
14 States Army or Headquarters Department of the Army, and our
15 Director of Operations Mobilization and Readiness, and that's
16 Chris LaNeve. But we make sure, I make sure that the right people
17 know it. Normally my job is I will get alerted sometimes from the
18 Exec Sec of OSD that we're getting a request and I will alert
19 Army senior leaders those four people, the Secretary, Under
20 Secretary, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff that we are in
21 receipt of a valid RFA which means it's signed and the staff has
22 it and is working, but in this instance Secretary McCarthy was
23 simultaneously aware of these requests coming in because he gets
24 a call -- General Walker will call him directly. I don't know if
25 he did but Secretary McCarthy was aware, and he was in dialogue

1 with OSD throughout the weekend and in dialogue with city
2 officials that weekend to make sure he understood the parameters
3 of their thinking, and we thought everything was in order of what
4 the Mayor and her -- the director of Homeland Security I forget his
5 name, I'm sorry.

6 Q: That was Dr. Rodriguez.

7 A: Yes. So Dr. Rodriguez sent their request to General
8 Walker, was indeed a valid one and as we flushed out how they
9 plan to use it that we were getting to a request that we thought
10 would gain approval and we would have to support.

11 Q: What I would like to know, General, is how the process
12 for getting approval of this particular request for assistance
13 differed from the norm and if so, why?

14 A: I think the -- the line of process worked the way it
15 normally does the Mayor, Dr. Rodriguez's letter to General
16 Walker, General Walker alerting, I'd say he's in receipt of the
17 letter, his letter followed on 1 January I believe. Having my
18 things I think it was 1 January, and he -- that he wrote a letter
19 to Secretary McCarthy, yes, on 1 January. That's the formal one,
20 but to me that's the right process. The process then how it works
21 differently of my assessment is because of the lessons we learned
22 from June Secretary McCarthy wanted to make sure he had the right
23 mission parameters and mission understanding before he asked for
24 permission to support.

25 Q: Did he use a different legal review this time? Was it

1 -- I mean because what I ask is OGC normally works for the
2 SecArmy, and OTJAG works for General McConville. I think OTJAG
3 was heavily involved at this time. Would you tell us about that?

4 A: Way -- well, the General Counsel was involved. Michelle
5 Pearce it was her lead. And I don't know exactly the time we did
6 it but I asked the TJAG, "Could we get an authority expert from
7 TJAG and then chop him or her over to the Secretary. Someone who
8 has expertise in National Guard authorities that could be on the
9 ground with them so that the General Counsel would not have to be
10 out on the, going with the Secretary as he traveled from
11 point-to-point. So, we cut her over to work directly for the
12 Secretary only limited on giving advice on authorities when it
13 comes to the mobilization and mission request for D.C. National
14 Guard. And then later --

15 Q: Was that Colonel [REDACTED] ?

16 A: Yes, [REDACTED], and, Colonel [REDACTED], sorry.
17 And then later other state National Guard commitment to
18 Washington D.C. , if we have another expert on the Army staff
19 I don't know who it is. But to me as the Director of the Army
20 staff s a phenomenal lawyer. an expert on it and she
21 could give advice and write the memorandums for the Secretary and
22 get General Counsel to review it and help get this process. We
23 just wanted to go fast and efficient without any administrative
24 delay so that we could meet or get to approval or disapproval,
25 but get to that level without any administrative delay.

1 Q: Did you anticipate that Colonel [REDACTED] would have to be
2 on the ground as you said with the Secretary the Army somewhere?

3 A: I did. Not that day. I did if he wanted to leave, and
4 this is me as the Director of the Army staff knowing the
5 Secretary I'm always trying to build support team for him if he
6 needs it. Just knowing the way he operates he likes to drive in a
7 vehicle and go face-to-face with people, but sometime when you
8 don't have the staff expertise next to him we may not get that
9 feedback and we may not be able to better support what he's
10 trying to get. That's just administrative. It's what I do
11 professionally not just for this mission but for any request I
12 get. I want to make sure the Secretary is surrounded by the right
13 people so that he gets the best advice that he needs, and then we
14 could translate his vision and intent into action as rapidly and
15 efficiently as possible.

16 Q: Okay, sir. What can you tell us about is your knowledge
17 of any communications that you had, or that Secretary McCarthy
18 had, or that any DoD official including Secretary Miller had in
19 the run-up to January 6 with the POTUS or anybody at the White
20 House?

21 A: I am not directly aware. I'm only aware of the
22 tick-tock or timeline that we -- that was published from OSD that
23 the Assistant Secretary and the Chairman met with the President.
24 And then, -- and then there were follow-on conversations between
25 the Chairman, the Acting Secretary. I believe they had conference

1 calls which the Secretary was involved in. After that call the
2 Secretary would say, "Okay. The SecDef and the Chairman met with
3 the President and we're going to get -- that would explain what
4 was happening," but really it was in support of the mission we
5 were asked to support.

6 Q: And when you say tick-tock or timeline are you talking
7 about document number five?

8 A: I did come directly -- yes.

9 Q: Okay. And is your knowledge of those conversations come
10 because you have document number five in your hand will, did you
11 know about those coordinations already?

12 A: Both because is because they came second hand. They had
13 a meeting at the White House and were looking like we're going to
14 get to approval. So it was like indirectly either from the Chief
15 or the Secretary stating that they met. And so they didn't give
16 us the details of the meeting. I wasn't in the meeting, but it
17 was I think relayed to a point that Secretary McCarthy would
18 relay higher is going to approve, kind of. We're going to do this
19 kind of his guidance I guess to us using those meetings, but not
20 a lot of details, but just awareness that it has occurred.

21 Q: What guidance did POTUS or anybody in the White House
22 give to Secretary, Acting Secretary Miller or Secretary McCarthy?

23 A: I don't know.

24 Q: I'm going to ask the same question but for any
25 communications with the POTUS or the White House on January 6?

1 What can you tell us about that?

2 A: Not that I'm aware of.

3 Q: Another question is were there any Title 10 forces
4 either active component or a reserve component in a Title 10
5 status staged or deployed on January 6?

6 A: No. I mean, well so let me clarify. So, we do have
7 ongoing other missions but not for this mission. I want to make
8 sure on --

9 Q: I mean for the mission for the events at the Capitol,
10 or for the --

11 A: No.

12 Q: -- or for the traffic control point RFA mission before
13 that?

14 A: No.

15 [REDACTED]: [REDACTED], I'm going to be going back through my
16 question list for some details. Let me break here and see if you
17 have something that I forgot.

18 BY [REDACTED]:

19 Q: I, well you kind of covered the discussion regarding
20 the Title 10 personnel but I wanted to get a little bit more
21 information regarding of MDW's participation. Understand that
22 [REDACTED], but during the
23 lead up to and the events at the Capitol there any elements from
24 MDW that you're aware that might have provided some type of
25 support either to the D.C. National Guard, or the D.C. agencies,

1 or federal agencies?

2 A: We provide operational advice and tools. I believe
3 those Soldiers that came from Headquarters Department of the Army
4 so we can have an LNO package and assistance if they needed help
5 with maps or graphics or to help facilitate interagency
6 communications. MDW was -- they were preparing for inauguration
7 rehearsal. I apologize. I forgot that. And they were -- and I
8 believe, no, that may have happened afterwards. I know that they
9 had a meeting on the Hill in regard to that, and it was canceled
10 because of security but I think that happened afterwards.

11 Q: Are you aware if there were any type of medical
12 personnel or support team that might have -- were from MDW that
13 might have provided any kind of support?

14 A: I am not.

15 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : Okay. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I don't have any other questions
16 right now.

17 BY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

18 Q: General Piatt, please tell us whether anyone denied or
19 delayed any aspect of what Mayor Bowser, Chief Sund, or anyone
20 else requested on January 6.

21 A: No one, from my perspective in what I witnessed that
22 day no one denied or delayed any support. Anything that was --
23 the time that it took was time that we could withdraw from one
24 mission, reequip, remission, recall forces, and reconfigures
25 support packages for a completely new mission. That time in my

1 observation of this was extremely, professionally, and quickly
2 done. I applauded the Guard after that fact. I don't know. I
3 don't know if anyone could go from a cold start, brand-new
4 mission set and collapsed their ongoing mission, recall from
5 doing a different mission or even a civilian mission, get back to
6 your headquarters, in this case the Armory. Get a new set of
7 mission orders, get your equipment issued, reconfigure, and head
8 to a different mission that was never even in our wildest
9 estimates was going to be a part of their mission set for this
10 time. It was completely new mission. I think they did extremely
11 fast and I don't think anything delayed them. I think there's
12 confusion, there's fog, there's friction, there's frustration,
13 but we knew that we could not just commit a force to an unknown
14 mission with an unclear set of not graphics, but with an unclear
15 task and purpose what they would be asked to do. We could see it
16 was the perimeter collapsed. It was a new mission of what I
17 assessed at the time is take back to the Capitol. If we would
18 have piece milled forces in there without a mission we would have
19 run the risk of doing incredible harm and probably losing the
20 force that was going to be needed to secure the Capitol. In my
21 professional observation this was done with extreme
22 professionalism and extreme speed.

23 Q: We heard the General Walker had trouble reaching Mr.
24 McCarthy for much of that afternoon of January 6. What can you
25 tell us about that?

1 A: I don't know how anybody could not reach Secretary
2 McCarthy that day. He, in my view his decision to go down town,
3 force this plan to come together, this new plan had he personally
4 worked with Chief Contee, Mayor Bowser, they did a press
5 conference. We were watching it as we were planning. It was
6 helpful to us. I don't know why if General Walker could not get a
7 hold of him why he didn't -- why he didn't move from the Armory
8 to the Police Headquarters and co-locate with the Secretary. I
9 can't answer that question why he wasn't there. The Secretary was
10 available. He had multiple phones. He was communicating several
11 -- he had a phone call with General Walker that I know of at
12 1635. They were available. I don't know why he felt that way. I
13 don't think anything was preventing him from moving down to that
14 location and help facilitate the plan that later he employed
15 forces to.

16 Q: What was General McConville's role on January 6 to all
17 of this played out?

18 A: General McConville makes it very clear to the Secretary
19 McCarthy the whole time that I am an advisor, and I am going to I
20 will give you advice. But, at this time he came into the phone
21 call because he heard -- they have a door between their offices
22 and they proudly boast about how they keep it open, and they do,
23 and when there's noise he heard it and he came in. He ran down
24 the hall with Secretary McCarthy so he could become located to
25 help with his best military advice. Once Secretary McCarthy made

1 the decision to go downtown General McConville actually had other
2 commitments that afternoon that he needed to do. It was a
3 deliberate decision that he wasn't needed in that capacity
4 anymore and he, I don't know what it was but I know it was not
5 related. He had to go in the meetings. He'd come out because he
6 does have an Army to run, but he would come out at various times
7 and get updates but he did not -- after the phone call and the
8 meeting with the SecDef to get the mobilization approval he was
9 not co-located with the Secretary for the rest of that day.

10 Q: What was General McConville's role in reviewing and
11 approving the original RFA from General Walker that was dated
12 January 1st?

13 A: He was available for the Secretary when we had small
14 meetings during the 2nd and 3rd to give his best military advice
15 on that, and he rendered it, and I think you see it in the letter
16 to Secretary Miller from Secretary McCarthy on the 4th, and then
17 I think you can see it in the letter from Secretary McCarthy to
18 General Walker on the 5th.

19 Q: We saw an e-mail. You were not on this e-mail but it
20 was an e-mail that somebody from NGB, the National Guard Bureau
21 wrote following a January 2nd meeting that Mr. McCarthy had with
22 the Secretary Miller, and in that e-mail the NGB official wrote
23 that, "Secretary Miller "pump the brakes" on it and had
24 concerns." What were his concerns? What did that mean "pump the
25 brakes"?

1 A: I'm trying to find that. I apologize.

2 Q: It's under number four.

3 A: Yeah, I'm trying to find that exact page. I've got an
4 e-mail here about five pages of e-mail. Okay. It's the first
5 sentence. I'm sorry. I jumped right by it. From, I'm seeing this
6 from Colonel . I don't know that person, and it to
7 [REDACTED]. That's the one you're talking about it says,
8 "Good morning, sir. There is a request to SecDef from for NG
9 support for 5/6 January scheduled protest. The Sec Def has pumped
10 the brakes. This information is strictly FYSA at this point and
11 not for dissemination." That is on Saturday, 2 January 9:23 AM.
12 That's the e-mail you're referring to?

13 A: Yes. I'm not so much concerned with who the authors
14 were, I'm trying to discern what the Secretary Miller's concerns
15 were and your interpretation of --

16 A: I don't --

17 Q: -- "pump the brakes".

18 A: I don't know. Until you sent this to us I had not seen
19 this. I would add though from 2 January from the Army perspective
20 in my -- I did not talk to Secretary Miller throughout that
21 weekend, but from receipt of General Walker's letter on the 1st
22 and guidance given to me by Secretary McCarthy on the second and
23 third I -- that term "pump the brakes" was never used or slow
24 down. It was we've got to get the right parameters in place to
25 support this request. That's all I ever --

1 Q: What that might be a segway into my next question. We
2 understand that Secretary McCarthy had a VTC on January 3rd that
3 included the Chief of Staff, Vice, yourself, General Flynn,
4 General LaNeve, and maybe some others. What was the discussion
5 there and the outcome of that VTC?

6 A: That's Sunday. I think, let me -- I'm just trying --
7 I'm looking through my notes I apologize but that is correct.
8 Secretary McCarthy I mean throughout COVID, this was not uncommon
9 for him to text me on the weekend and say, "Get me a VTC 30
10 minutes. 5 minutes I want this group on it." And that group
11 normally was the senior leaders, General LaNeve, General Flynn,
12 and myself. Now this VTC I don't recall anyone else being on it.
13 However, if one of the general's had their XO or someone in the
14 room I didn't know that, but there wasn't another primary and his
15 -- on Sunday, January 3rd I recall he came back from talking. He
16 actually went downtown at some point, came back, and said, "They
17 have a good plan. He got a better understanding of their request.
18 He understood the Mayor." These are my words not his, my words of
19 what he kind of what he said to us that, "The Mayor and the Chief
20 had been looking at an area of the city that perhaps there could
21 be counter protests and they wanted to make sure they had
22 parameters in place to protect peaceful demonstrations and
23 population moving into and out of the city."

24 Q: Chief of Police?

25 A: That's why the -- pardon me?

1 Q: You said the Chief, Chief of Police not Chief of Staff,
2 right?

3 A: Yeah, Chief of Police. This was his -- he went
4 downtown. He came back, and then we talked about how can we
5 facilitate? And we started talking the parameters. Again it's the
6 situation or incident in June inform the advice that's being
7 given to the Secretary at this time. So, I'm taking notes.
8 General LaNeve, or no, we were just listening I think, but on the
9 3rd in my mind I'm thinking we are going to -- this is going to
10 end with a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense either late
11 tonight or Monday morning. That was my listening to him talk. He
12 was going through what I call his COA development on how we can
13 support this, what parameters would be necessary to ensure the
14 safety of National Guard Soldiers being utilized for this type of
15 operation? And he was kind of like what e fing? Okay. "What would
16 we need, what will be do," and everybody would go around and give
17 kind of advice, and he, I remember because the Secretary said,
18 "Okay. I think I'm going to recommend we not support unless these
19 following conditions are met. We have a lead federal agency. We
20 see that other agencies have exhausted their forces. We have a
21 coherent plan. We understand and have a shared understanding of
22 the size of the demonstrations." And in this case we're still
23 going by the 10 registered ones, and also, "What's the shared
24 threat assessment from FBI or Homeland Security?" And he was
25 going through these ideas, and we were quickly coming to the

1 conclusion is we're probably not going to get that and he came
2 back and in his mind he thought this was a mission that we should
3 support. That's my read of his body language I think on the VTC,
4 and his tone, what he was asking. He was going back and forth
5 with himself and as the Director the Army staff I read back to
6 him all the things he had said, what the Chief recommended like,
7 "Look. We've got to have good use of force. We have to have
8 prescribed mission parameters. We have to have prescribed mission
9 kits. We have to make sure the Soldiers are trained. They've got
10 all the right equipment that they need." Just as the Chief of
11 Staff of the Army would rattle that off he did. So I kind of read
12 back. I said, "Okay. Here's what I think you're saying, Mr.
13 Secretary." And I said, "But I think my assessment." As his
14 Director, I said, "I think what you really want to do is you want
15 to approve this pending -- you want to recommend approval if the
16 following conditions are met."

17 Q: That was your --

18 A: And then ended up --

19 Q: That was a recommendation, sir?

20 A: That evening, Sunday evening it was my recommendation.

21 So, now --

22 Q: Let me ask you, I'm confused by one thing though. In
23 those conditions there's A, B, and C I believe is what it says.
24 There was no lead federal agency other than -- no other federal
25 agency other than the DoD. So, I'm confused by that particular

1 language about the federal agency.

2 A: On the memorandum on January 4?

3 Q: Yes, sir.

4 A: Is that what you are -- okay so we looked at he says --
5 he submitted his request and the concept of operations for my
6 approval. "I recommend D.C. National Guard support this mission
7 if the following conditions are met." This was us recommending to
8 the Secretary of Defense that he lobby or advise for a lead
9 federal agency other than DoD to enable enhanced coordination of
10 all entities. Because in our dialogue while putting together the
11 concept of the operation we needed shared understanding of the
12 threat. We wanted to have shared understanding of operations and
13 who would be able to be in support of whom, and have a common
14 operational, common understanding of activities within the city.
15 That was our thought process.

16 Q: So, to clarify you --

17 A: We had several --

18 Q: To clarify, sir, I'm sorry to interrupt once again.

19 A: Yeah.

20 Q: But to clarify -- so, in this memorandum you're
21 recommending -- the Secretary is recommending to Acting Secretary
22 Miller that the Department should inquire into whether there was
23 another -- other federal assets available which would -- which
24 one of whom -- one of which could serve as a lead federal agency?

25 A: Yes. Because what we had from the concept to the

1 operation is you had the Metropolitan Police Department with the
2 Mayor that was the only operation we had to support. Every other
3 entity, Capitol Police, Department of Justice, Park Police,
4 Secret Service, Metro I mean they all had their own separate
5 plan. What we were suggesting is, what we're recommending is if
6 you have a lead federal agency you have a consolidated,
7 synchronize, integrated plan that would have a common level of
8 understanding of threats and resources available to support.

9 Q: Okay.

10 A: Much like we had after 6 January in the lead up to the
11 inauguration. There were other conditions written on there. That
12 was the VTC on 3 January, and I want to say we took a break and
13 then reconvened at some point. I think he got a phone call but it
14 was pretty common. We all have the secure VTC's in our home
15 offices so we all come up on Secretary's bridge and we start
16 rattling off. Once that was done I did recommend, I said, "Mr.
17 Secretary, I just recommend we change the language to we request
18 if the following conditions are met not I'm denying unless." Just
19 a positive because he believes we should support this CONOP. He
20 thinks it's a good CONOP at this point and that we should support
21 it. That's my assessment as his Director. My job now is to get a
22 staff product developed that night and reviewed by Ms. Pearce,
23 and I think she reviewed it by 7:00 o'clock in the morning, or
24 6:30 and then we had a -- I think we had a brief and I don't know
25 if it was 7:00 or 7:30 but the Secretary said, "All right." He

1 ended the VTC with, "I want to meet at -- I want the memo done
2 tomorrow. We'll do a final scrub. I will -- I want my phone call
3 meeting with Acting Secretary Miller changed to an in person
4 meeting and I want to give him this signed memo and ask his
5 permission to provide, or provide that support." We met the next
6 morning on 4 January in his office. I -- we had drafted a letter
7 that evening or memo and the Secretary -- we handed it out to the
8 Chief and the Secretary and they pretty much red inked my
9 recommendation. I mean it was bloody. It was embarrassing in
10 front of the staff, his young staff, but again we did not have
11 any staff on that call that night. We had -- the lowest ranking
12 person was a general and that was Brigadier General LaNeve, and
13 General LaNeve, me, and General Flynn were trying to after that
14 meeting stayed on a different LAN and said, "What did they say?
15 This is what we think he said." We wrote down the bullets. Sent
16 it to the admin team. Said, "Draft for tomorrow." And they did.
17 They got it done. They got it in there. He bloodied it up and I
18 remember apologizing to him that I missed his intent. He said,
19 "No. You wrote down exactly what we said. It's just not
20 important." Because, we had -- we just had different things in
21 there that didn't make the final version, but then that ended up
22 in this version of this January 4 memo from him to Secretary
23 Miller and then they walked down the hall. I wasn't in the
24 meeting.

25 Q: General?

1 A: But I know.

2 Q: The one that got bloodied up, the version, was that the
3 one that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) drafted?

4 A: Yeah, I believe --

5 Q: She's an attorney in OGC.

6 A: Yes, I believe OGC. Yes. We probably gave her some
7 bullet points, but yes I believe so.

8 Q: Okay. Do you have a hard stop at 1600, sir?

9 A: I can go a little bit later, yes.

10 Q: Okay. We're going to try to be as expeditiously as
11 possible. That's one reason I keep interrupting you. I want to be
12 respectful of your time, but also get to all of these questions.

13 A: Okay.

14 Q: And so, I understand that now you've got to memorandum
15 for Secretary Miller, or the letter for Acting Secretary Miller
16 from Secretary McCarthy, and then you get his employment guidance
17 back dated the same day in the letter to Secretary McCarthy. Very
18 briefly can you -- what do we need to understand about any
19 process around putting together Secretary McCarthy's letter dated
20 5 January to General Walker, and who has copies of the decision
21 packages that would have accompanied getting Secretary McCarthy's
22 signatures on those documents?

23 A: Okay. So for the last question first. I don't know if
24 we had decision packages. I think we had drafts iterating between
25 his personal staff and probably General LaNeve trying to

1 facilitate refined CONOP from the D.C. National Guard of where
2 they're going to be placed in those -- within those constraints.
3 I do recall though on the letter from Secretary Miller they all
4 made sense to us. Nobody said, "Oh, this is going to make it. We
5 can't do it." Nobody that I know of pushed back on that. It was
6 clear guidance, and I think all our assumption was this was based
7 on the lessons learned from June.

8 Q: Any pushback from the D.C. National Guard on the
9 January 5th letter from Secretary McCarthy to them?

10 A: There was discussion back on particularly they read
11 back the letter of the directive and it was they -- I don't think
12 it was pushback. When they briefed back their plan the questions
13 were asked, "Okay. Where is your protection gear? Where's your
14 helmet and vest?" "Well, the letter says I can't have it with
15 me." And Secretary McCarthy said, "You need to have it available.
16 It needs to be where can it be that is available?" And one course
17 of action discussed, and I don't think this was a written drawing
18 I think it was an open discussion was, "Well, we can move it from
19 the armory if needed." And Secretary McCarthy said, "That will be
20 too late. You need to have your helmet and your ballistic vest in
21 the vehicle or near where your - wherever your vehicle is
22 rested." Because some of them were dismounted away from the
23 vehicle, but it needed to be there so it wouldn't be seen,
24 because it was clear that they were not to wear it because again
25 that's the posture we wanted them in to facilitate that mission.

1 That was really the one point of contention, but it really wasn't
2 contentious. It was really clarity that they were asking for,
3 because we wanted to know then, okay, can you protect yourself?
4 You have your right to self-defense. Could you do it? And then in
5 that iteration, and that was a professional dialogue was, I need
6 -- we need to have the vest and helmet in close proximity.

7 Q: Okay. Thank you, sir. I'm going to, just a couple more
8 questions. What is your response to any criticism that the DoD
9 should have had a robust presence at the Capitol building already
10 on the 6th as a deterrent?

11 A: Yeah I think, you know I go back and Secretary McCarthy
12 said only one agency asked for our help and we supported that. We
13 supported that with the request that they needed. The Capitol
14 police did not request it, and I don't -- I think the -- you know
15 I go back to my professional assessment here is the United States
16 Army shouldn't be used to determine the outcome of elections. I
17 think that is the police mission, and I believe that the District
18 has sufficient amount of police forces to ensure protection of
19 their population or their facilities and if not there's a
20 mechanism to request for additional assets.

21 Q: What is your response to any criticism that the DoD
22 should have been pre-positioned and ready to respond at a
23 moment's notice if requested or required on the 6th?

24 A: That's not our mission. For the Department of Defense
25 that active duty force is to respond that's a police mission. We

1 protect the nation. We don't police the nation.

2 Q: Does the DoD have any duty or responsibility to
3 intervene or be prepared for civil disturbances in the absence of
4 any request for assistance from a civil authority?

5 A: Not without a request. I mean we have -- and you know
6 we do have consequence management things on alert but I'm talking
7 about for this mission as they saw it not without a request.

8 Q: Why have some members of the, or one or more members of
9 the DoD described the approval process to support federal or D.C.
10 government officials in this incident as "archaic"? What is your
11 --

12 A: I don't know but I know I've heard -- I've heard the
13 Secretary and in his role he would say I'm up for a review of how
14 the system works because it does appear to be maybe perhaps not
15 as responsive as it should." As he had to personally -- as the
16 Secretary the Army get personally involved in the events in June.
17 I know he said we should review those things. So, I don't know
18 why people would say that specifically, but like anything -- any
19 mechanism we used to gain decision may be outdated. It may have
20 been designed for a time that has since passed and we should be
21 constantly checking our systems to make sure that they are
22 relevant and can respond to need if needed. That is broadly so I
23 don't ever push back when people tell me that. I would just say,
24 "Okay, explain why and what do we need to do to review?" And I
25 say that just in my role as the Director of the Army staff. We

1 have a lot of systems that people will say, "Okay. If it's
2 archaic then what's your answer? Do you have a recommendation?"
3 And I believe that we are in an information age. Someday -- we
4 ought to be looking hard at how we do just about anything to make
5 sure it's the most efficient to respond and in the correct manner
6 with the authorities given.

7 Q: What else should the Army be looking at, or what
8 lessons did the Army learn from all of this?

9 A: I think the -- I think the lesson is that we must have
10 that unified, or that, I'm sorry, the lead federal agency in the
11 unified plan when there's a -- so as we can have common
12 understanding of the threat and we can have common understanding
13 of the operations as they're unfolding. And that's -- we do that
14 when were independent or when we're working with other DoD, or
15 partners and allies, but when you worked with other federal
16 agencies you need to build those relationships and establish them
17 before there's a crisis not after. But that, you know we had
18 done. I don't know, it's probably -- I don't know the formal
19 lessons we've learned. I do now know that for me as a military
20 professional I was sickened by what I saw. I mean I've been in
21 the Army since I was 17 years old. I never thought I'd see my own
22 Capitol attacked and I never thought I would see national leaders
23 of like my nation, some of who I know personally have their lives
24 threatened, and I as a military professional was not in a
25 position to do anything personally, but I was in a position to do

1 my duty. But that's a personal observation. It sickened me and I
2 know that we will AAR this correctly as a government and we will
3 learn the lessons of how we have to prepare and share information
4 so that we can protect our nation from all enemies foreign and
5 domestic.

6 Q: You mentioned a common threat picture, or that might be
7 my term, or words to that effect. What Intel or threat
8 information was the Army tracking prior to January 6?

9 A: We were only tracking, as far as I know I was only
10 tracking planned and registered demonstrations. We had no
11 intelligence and we kept getting asked from people, "What's your
12 intelligence?" And we had to remind people, "We do not collect on
13 U.S. citizens of the United States." We depend on the FBI to
14 share intelligence and we did not get any intelligence that led
15 -- that indicated anything was going to be as violent as we saw.

16 Q: Much has been made of the January 5th FBI information
17 that came from their Norfolk field office that came into the
18 Joint Terrorism Task Force. Did you receive that information on
19 January 5 or any time before the 6th, and if you didn't, did
20 anybody in the Army receive that information?

21 A: I did not. I don't know if anyone in the Army did. Our
22 link with the Joint Terrorism Task Force is our Provost Marshal
23 General who reports that. She's been reporting daily on any
24 possible threat streams, social media chatter that was -- that
25 we're seeing. So, I don't know if we got that.

1 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), any questions for General Piatt before
2 I move into the read out?

3 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : I do not.

4 BY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

5 Q: Okay, sir. What -- you're aware of the scope of our
6 review. So what is it we're not asking that we ought to be asking
7 you? What else is it that we need to understand that will help
8 us?

9 A: Yeah well thank you. I think there's a lot of
10 differences between, you've indicated between what I'm saying and
11 perhaps testimony. And I think it's a matter of how the D.C.
12 National Guard looks at how they accomplish a mission because
13 even in this crisis one their senior leaders told me when we went
14 into the planning cycle that we do not plan. We are only provide
15 forces. And what we saw from June is providing forces for
16 somebody else's control can be dangerous and possibly deadly.
17 What General Walker said yesterday is that, "I could have
18 provided 150 people and I would have put them -- I would have
19 sent them to the Capitol and I would have told them to link up
20 with the senior policeman they could find and take instructions."
21 To us that's why these mission these mission parameters were put
22 into place because if that would have happened we would have had
23 -- we would have piece milled forces probably in the rear of a
24 violent crowd and I don't know what we would have done that we
25 may have killed civilians that may have been observing a peaceful

1 demonstration. We could have lost our National Guard Soldiers,
2 but it could have been ugly. We were sending forces in without
3 understanding the situation and without a clear mission and how
4 they would be in support of the agency that was under duress. To
5 us that's not the way you can employ forces but that is the way
6 they see it as accomplishing their mission. So, when they say we
7 could have done this in this amount of time they mean go to the
8 Capitol. No route was selected. No link up point was known. No
9 communications were established, and no mission was understood.
10 And that's why Secretary McCarthy put that in the memorandum that
11 you owe me a CONOP if you're going to change the mission or
12 request to commit the QRF. And then as a military professional,
13 as the commanding general who have commanded the division in Iraq
14 I can't imagine sending a subordinate element of my command into
15 a situation that violent without clearly understanding the
16 mission. It would be like me saying, "Go to Baghdad and just find
17 somebody and see what they need." And I know I'm getting a little
18 riled up here but we're watching this unfold that day, and my job
19 as the Director I was like leading an orchestra. I had to calm
20 down a lot of tempers, and I had to formulate option so that we
21 could provide options to the Secretary who because I know him I
22 knew he was downtown coming up with a plan and he was going to
23 turn to us and say go, and we better damn be ready to meet it.
24 Now, a lot of people may take exception to how I did that. I
25 think I stayed calm and tried to build a team. A lot of people

1 may have interpreted that as I was holding them back, and I think
2 that's where they get that that we were holding them back of what
3 they wanted to do. I don't view it that way. I think by
4 developing a plan and having a purpose we responded quickly,
5 efficiently, safely and were able to take back the Capitol and by
6 2000 Congress is back in, and by 0400 the elections were
7 validated, and by 0700 to 0900 we're starting to put fencing up
8 at the Capitol and we're never going to let that happen to our
9 Capitol again. Now, people, they judged DoD's response in that
10 3-hour window I think it was more like 2 hours, but they don't
11 judge the fact that once you put DoD in motion there was nobody
12 entering the city that was going to contest the inauguration of
13 the rightfully elected official and the foundation of our
14 democracy was upheld.

15 Q: Is there anything, any additional information you'd
16 like to provide to us, sir?

17 A: I want to say, and I do want to say for the record I am
18 extremely proud of those National Guard Soldiers that recalled
19 without knowledge, responded to the crisis of their nation, and
20 deployed to that Capitol with no prior coordination. They are
21 amazing heroes. I also want to complement Mayor Bowser and Chief
22 Contee for their foresight to see the need to have a request and
23 to do that request properly, and to iterate with us that must
24 have been frustrating over the weekend but that we got that CONOP
25 worked and got it right. I think they did the right thing for

1 their city. It turned out not to be needed, but they did the
2 right thing. And, the National Guard, the D.C. National Guard
3 once again at the Soldier level I think executed a critical
4 mission in rapid speed. I don't know if we would have had a Title
5 10 force, even a Tier I unit do it faster. I don't think we would
6 have, and they did it, and they entered an unknown. They turned
7 from an unknown and developed into a plan in I think the rapid
8 time and allowed the District to secure the Capitol, take back
9 the Capitol, and allowed our government to get back to the
10 functioning of the responsibilities they had executed that
11 evening.

12 Q: Can you think of anyone that we haven't already
13 mentioned, that you haven't already mentioned today that we
14 should talk to?

15 A: I can't. I'm assuming you talked to or will talk to
16 Secretary McCarthy.

17 Q: Well, I can't answer that question, sir. I'm just
18 asking for your suggestions on anybody that we haven't already
19 mentioned today.

20 A: The people I mentioned, I'm sorry. I'll rephrase. I'm
21 sorry. The people I mentioned absolutely Secretary McCarthy.
22 General LaNeve. General Flynn, but I think it's really General
23 LaNeve and I are the close fight people, or close crisis people
24 for the Secretary and General Flynn's long-range strategic
25 planner, and developer, and modernizer of the Army, as the G3,
and that's how we developed efforts. I think it's worth it but I
think those folks that I mentioned are definitely should be talk
to.

Q: Thank you. Do you have any questions?

A: I do not, sir.

Q: Do you have any concerns about the way we conducted
this interview?

A: I do not, sir.

Q: When you remember anything else that you believe may be
relevant to our review would you please contact us?

A: I will.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): Finally, in order to protect the integrity
of our review we ask that you not discuss the matters under
review or the questions we've asked you during this interview
with anyone other than your attorney there, but this does not
apply to or restrict your right to contact an Inspector General
or a Member of Congress. If anyone asks you about your testimony
or the review please inform that person that the DoD Inspector
General asked you not to discuss the matter, and if anybody
persists in asking about your testimony, or the review, or you
feel threatened in any manner because you provided testimony
please contact us. The time is now 4:16 p.m. This interview is
concluded.

[The interview terminated at 4:16 p.m., March 4, 2021.]